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Abstract
We use a unique set of equities in the when-issued market to provide new tests of the law
of one price in financial markets. We compare the prices of when-issued and regular-way
shares of publicly-traded subsidiaries and their parents around the time the subsidiaries
are fully divested. In contrast to prior analyses of when-issued trading in equity markets,
we find that the when-issued shares of the subsidiary trade at a discount. Some of the
pricing differences stem from measurement factors such as exchange location and bid-ask
clustering that bias the observed when-issued pricing differential away from zero. The
remaining difference between the when-issued and regular-way prices is due to
asymmetric movements in bid and ask quotes in the two markets. We also find evidence
of temporary price pressures on the date of execution of the spinoff of the subsidiary
firms that bear resemblance to the pricing in the when-issued market. We interpret the
evidence as consistent with the law of one price in the presence of transaction costs.1
Is there Really a When-Issued Premium?
I. Introduction
A fundamental tenet of financial economics is the law of one price, which states
that identical assets will have the same market value. The law of one price is the linchpin
of a well-functioning market, whether a stock exchange, the retail sector, or international
trade. In financial markets, tests of the law of one price are considered tests of market
efficiency.
Recent critics of market efficiency such as Thaler (1999) and Shleifer (2000)
question whether the law of one price holds for financial assets. As evidence counter to
market efficiency, these authors point to reported mispricing in pairs trading studies of
closed-end funds (Lee, Shleifer & Thaler (1991)) and of dual-listed international
securities (Rosenthal and Young (1990), Froot and Dabora (1999), Rosenthal (1999)).
Other examples of reported rejections of the law of one price in financial markets include
primes and scores (Barber (1994)) and tech-stock carve-outs (Lamont and Thaler (2001)).
The cited pairs studies, however, are not clean tests of market efficiency. Many of
the reported violations of the law of one price entail pairs of securities with significant
costs of arbitrage. Pontiff (1996), for example, finds that pricing differences between
closed-end funds and underlying securities reflect costly arbitrage. (See, also, Elton,
Gruber, and Busse (1998).) Trading across international financial exchanges also has
non-trivial costs. For primes and scores, Jarrow and O’Hara (1989) find that pricing
differences reflect the cost of dynamic hedging. Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2002)2
show that the inter-temporal arbitrage between parent firms and publicly traded
subsidiaries is constrained by information costs and idiosyncratic risk.
A cleaner setting for tests of the law of one price comes from when-issued trading
in equity markets. When-issued trading occurs immediately preceding the issuance of
new shares of a security due to an event such as a stock split. The when-issued shares of
the prospective security trade parallel to the regular-way shares in the same trading
location and offer the same claims to the firm’s cash flows. Hence, when-issued trading
avoids many of the costs that impede arbitrage in the other pairs trading experiments and
provides a novel setting for tests of the law of one price. The law of one price predicts
that the when-issued shares, properly adjusted for the split factor, will trade at the same
price as the regular-way shares.
In the first study of when-issued trading, Choi and Strong (1983) surprisingly find
that when-issued shares trade at a premium over regular-way shares. As reported in Panel
A of Appendix A, subsequent research has also found the existence of a when-issued
premium for both stock splits and corporate spinoffs. Related research has found
evidence of non-zero returns on the execution date of the same events. (See Panel B of
Appendix A.) As summarized in Appendix B, this evidence of a when-issued premium
and of non-zero ex-date returns has been followed by a number of potential explanations,
ranging from market inefficiency, to improper measurement, to market microstructure
considerations. No consistent explanation has been offered.
In this paper, we use novel when-issued trading data to offer new tests of the law
of one price in financial markets. The sample entails NYSE-listed, publicly-traded
subsidiaries such as Lucent Technologies, Allstate, and Delphi Automotive Systems. The3
when-issued trading that we study occurs in the period around the time the subsidiaries
are fully spun off to the public from their parents such as AT&T, Sears, and General
Motors.
A unique aspect of our data is that, because the subsidiary firm is publicly held,
there is when-issued and regular-way trading in the subsidiary itself prior to the execution
date. The subsidiary shares, therefore, are free of the trading constraints that induce
clienteles (Vijh (1994)) and create convenience (Nayar and Rozeff (2001)) for when-
issued shares immediately preceding stock splits and the spinoff of wholly-owned
subsidiaries. We use the publicly-traded subsidiaries to distinguish the clientele and
convenience explanations from other possible sources of pricing differences between
when-issued and regular-way trading.
An additional feature of our data set is that it allows us to compare when-issued
pricing for the subsidiary with that for the parent. These comparisons allow us to further
distinguish the theories that have been offered to explain the when-issued premium.
Among the questions that we address is why the premium for subsidiaries is of a different
sign as that for parents.
We conclude our analysis by studying the magnitude and direction of the
execution date returns for the subsidiary and parent firms. This allows us to test whether,
as predicted by some theories, the when-issued premium and the ex-date return emanate
from a similar source. Analysis of the execution date also facilitates tests as to whether
the when-issued pricing differences reflect either temporary price pressures or, instead,
more permanent effects induced by a downward sloping demand for securities.4
Our principal finding is that the when-issued shares of the subsidiary firms trade
at a discount to the regular-way shares. This contrasts with the premium found in both
prior research and for the parent firms in our sample. Some of the price differential
between the when-issued and regular-way shares can be explained by measurement
factors such as exchange location and bid-ask clustering. The remaining differences stem
from asymmetric movements in bid and ask quotes. As a whole, we interpret the evidence
to be consistent with the law of one price in the presence of transaction costs.
The following section more fully reviews the prior literature and the offered
explanations for the when-issued premium. Section III describes the sample. Section IV
reports the findings for the when-issued premium for the subsidiary firms. The fifth
section reports comparable estimates for the parent-subsidiary pairs. Section VI reports
related evidence for the execution date return of the subsidiary and of the parent. The
final section summarizes and offers concluding comments.
II. Literature Review
A.  Prior Research on the When-Issued Premium
When-issued trading occurs in equity markets immediately preceding the issuance of new
shares of a security. Events that trigger when-issued trading include stock splits and
corporate spinoffs. The when-issued shares of the prospective security trade parallel to
regular-way shares on organized markets such as the New York Stock Exchange and the
price and volume data for the when-issued shares are reported next to the regular-way
data in the Wall Street Journal, the Daily Stock Price Record, and other sources. The
when-issued shares offer comparable claims to a firm’s cash flows as regular-way shares.5
Choi and Strong (1983) rely on the features of when-issued trading to provide a
novel test of the law of one price in securities markets. They hypothesize that the when-
issued price, properly adjusted for the split factor, will equal the regular-way price. Choi
and Strong (1983) study 128 firms that have when-issued trading preceding a stock split.
In a surprising result, they find that the split-adjusted when-issued shares trade at a 1.17
percent premium over the regular-way shares, even after controlling for differences in
settlement procedures.
As surveyed in Panel A of Appendix A, subsequent analysis offers confirming
evidence of a when-issued premium. Lamoreux and Wansley (1989), Brooks and Chiou
(1995), and Nayar and Rozeff (2001) all report a positive difference between when-
issued and regular-way shares prior to stock splits. Vijh (1994) reports a when-issued
premium of 2.41 percent for a sample of 29 parent firms that spin off fully-owned
subsidiaries.
B.  Prior Research on Ex-Date Returns
A parallel literature studies stock returns on the date of execution of stock splits and
corporate spinoffs. (See Panel B of Appendix A for a survey.) Similar to when-issued
trading, execution dates offer novel tests of market efficiency. The dates are known well
in advance and, for events such as stock splits, are rarely cancelled. Hence, the execution
dates contain no new information and would be expected to have a zero return.
As in the when-issued literature, the results for execution dates are surprising.
Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984) find a significant return of 1.95 percent on the
execution date of stock splits. Maloney and Mulherin (1992) and Conrad and Conroy6
(1994) report similar findings for stock splits. Copeland, Lembgruber and Mayers (1987)
and Vijh (1994) also find a positive return on the execution date of corporate spinoffs.
Hwang (1995) reports a –5.09 percent return on the execution of reverse stock splits.
The prior research has noted a relation between the when-issued premium and the
non-zero execution date return. Both Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984) and Maloney
and Mulherin (1992) note the comparable magnitude of the when-issued premium and the
execution date return and conjecture that common underlying factors explain the two
phenomena. Vijh (1994) explicitly detects a linkage between the when-issued premium
and ex-date returns for corporate spinoffs. Nayar and Rozeff (2001) report a similar
linkage for stock splits. Furthermore, Vijh (1994, p.584) conjectures that both the stock
split and spinoff findings are related, as a spinoff can be viewed as a split with uneven
pieces.
C.  Potential Explanations for the When-Issued Premium and the Ex-Date
Return
The initial evidence of a when-issued premium by Choi and Strong (1983) has been
followed by a number of papers seeking an explanation. Appendix B outlines the various
possible explanations that have been offered in the literature. The questions that have
been addressed include: Why is there a when-issued premium? and Why is there a link
between the when-issued premium and the ex-date return?
One possible explanation for the when-issued premium is market inefficiency.
Indeed, critics of market efficiency such as Thaler (1999) and Shleifer (2000) use similar
cases of pairs trading as evidence that simple arbitrage does not function in securities7
markets. Thaler (1999) references the pricing of dual-listed international securities
(Rosenthal and Young (1990), Froot and Dabora (1999), Rosenthal (1999)). Shleifer
(2000) points to research on closed-end funds (e.g, Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991)).
Other evidence of anomalous pairs trading includes Barber’s (1994) analysis of primes
and scores and Lamont and Thaler’s (2001) research on tech stock carve-outs.
Of course, evidence for or against market efficiency must incorporate transaction
costs (Jensen (1978), Fama (1991)). Moreover, tests of apparent trading rules must
account not only for trading costs but also the selection bias of ex-post strategies (Phillips
and Smith (1980)). Hence, the literature on when-issued trading and ex-date returns has
examined whether the apparent mispricing emanates from either improper measurement
or market microstructure factors.
C.1. Improper Measurement
Brooks and Chiou (1995) suggest that one reason for the when-issued premium is
differential timing of trades. They note that actual when-issued and regular-way trades do
not always occur at identical times. In their analysis, Brooks and Chiou (1995) use
intraday data to match the timing of when-issued and regular-way trades. The adjustment
for the timing of trades follows the spirit of related research by Bookstaber (1983),
Bhattacharya (1983), and Lin and Rozeff (1995).
Though not explicitly treated in the when-issued literature, another important
measurement issue is stock exchange location. By SEC rules, NYSE-listed securities can
also trade on the regional stock exchanges. As noted by Lee (1993), trades on the
regionals tend to get less favorable execution. Hence a bias in the estimation of the when-8
issued premium may occur if the when-issued and regular-way shares have a differential
likelihood of executing on the NYSE vis-à-vis the regionals. In recognition of such
factors, Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) restrict their analysis to NYSE quotes
when studying trading activity with the TAQ database.
Another measurement issue stems from bid-ask clustering. Lamoreux and
Wansley (1989) and Brooks and Chiou (1995) note that when-issued and regular-way
shares may have a differential likelihood of trading at bid or ask prices. Such differences
could create an observed pricing difference between when-issued and regular-way shares.
The bias from bid-ask clustering has also been studied for stock split and spinoff ex-date
returns (Maloney and Mulherin (1992), Conrad and Conroy (1994), Copeland,
Lemgruber and Mayers (1987)).
In related analysis, Lease, Masulis and Page (1991) study the effect of bid-ask
clustering on the day of equity offerings. The authors argue that the prices observed in
secondary market trading are more likely to occur at bid prices, because purchase orders
are directed to the primary market that day. As a diagnostic, Lease, Masulis and Page
(1991) use the order flow ratio, defined as (Ask Price – Transaction Price) / (Ask Price –
Bid Price), to detect clustering of transaction prices at bids or asks around execution.
In their analysis of when-issued trading, Brooks and Chiou (1995) control for bid-
ask clustering by studying intraday bid and ask prices. While they find that bid-ask
clustering explains away part of the observed when-issued premium, Brooks and Chiou
(1995, p.454) conclude that the remaining premium for when-issued shares is puzzling.9
C.2. Market Microstructure
In addition to simple measurement issues, the when-issued and ex-date literature suggest
that market microstructure phenomena may explain some or all of the when-issued
premium. We consider three microstructure factors that have been treated in the prior
literature: (1) order flow imbalance, (2) investor clientele, and (3) convenience. As we
will discuss, these three factors are related and are sometimes used interchangeably in the
literature. We first describe the three phenomena and then distinguish their empirical
content.
Relying on inventory models of the bid-ask spread (e.g., Ho and Stoll (1981)),
Maloney and Mulherin (1992) and Conrad and Conroy (1994) relate ex-date returns to
microstructure phenomena beyond simple bid-ask bounce. They argue that around events
such as the execution of stock splits, market makers can face order flow imbalances.
These order imbalances may induce an asymmetric movement of bid and ask prices in the
direction of the order flow. The source of the order imbalance is the underlying purpose
of the stock split: the addition of shareholders. If this addition occurs on the execution
date, then the influx of buyers leads the market maker to disproportionately raise ask
prices and thus create a non-arbitrageable positive return on the execution date. The story
is consistent with more recent evidence of an increase of small, uninformed buyers on the
ex-date by Schultz (2000) and Easley, O’Hara and Saar (2001). Order flow imbalance is
also used by Hwang (1995) to argue that the negative return on the execution of reverse
stock splits is driven by an asymmetric decline in ask prices. Maloney and Mulherin
(1992, p.46) conjecture that the when-issued premium anticipates the imbalance of order
flow on the ex-date.10
A related story offered by Vijh (1994) is tied to investor clienteles. (See, also,
Hakansson (1982).) Vijh (1994) argues that for the spinoff of wholly-owned subsidiaries,
the execution date is an important event because it is the first date that an investor can
obtain a piece of a regular-way share of either the subsidiary or the new parent. This
trading constraint may affect the pricing of the separate pieces, the new parent and the
new subsidiary, when they become available. Noting that it is an empirical issue, Vijh
(1994, p.595) argues that the magnitude and direction of the ex-date return will depend
on the relative number of investors that wish to hold only either the new subsidiary or
new parent. He further argues that the when-issued premium may reflect similar factors.
A third explanation, also offered by Vijh (1994), stems from the convenience of
trading. Vijh (1994) notes that after the record date for a spinoff, regular-way shares are
relatively less convenient because of the attachment of due bills. Nayar and Rozeff
(2001) offer evidence in support of this story for stock splits. They find a negative return
around record dates and further show that the record date decline is associated with both
the when-issued premium and the ex-date return.
These three microstructure phenomena are related in that they offer non-
information reasons for price differentials and ex-date stock returns. Moreover, the three
factors are often used interchangeably in the literature. For example, in developing his
clientele and convenience arguments, Vijh (1994, p. 583) states that a spinoff may pose
unique inventory balancing problems for market makers. Similarly, Nayar and Rozeff
(2001, p.122) state that the convenience preference of investors may induce inventory
build up by market makers.11
In spite of the underlying similarity of the three phenomena, the arguments are
distinct enough to provide empirical content. A unique prediction of the order flow
imbalance explanation is that the magnitude of the when-issued premium can differ when
estimated at bid or ask prices, with the asymmetry being a function of the direction of the
order imbalance. (See, for example, Maloney and Mulherin (1992).) A further distinction
between the order flow imbalance explanation and the convenience story is in the
direction of the predicted sign of the when-issued premium. The convenience story
predicts that the when-issued premium would always be positive, due to the absence of
due bills for when-issued trading. By contrast, the order flow imbalance explanation
predicts that the sign of the when-issued and regular-way differential will depend on the
direction of the order flow imbalance. (See, for example, Hwang (1995).)
Another distinction between the three explanations is based on the predicted
permanence of the ex-date effect. As noted in related literature such as Harris and Gurel
(1986) and Barclay and Litzenberger (1988), ex-date returns can reflect either (1) a
temporary price pressure or (2) a permanent price movement caused by downward
sloping demand curves for securities. The existence of temporary price pressures is
consistent with the Second Law of Demand which states that price elasticity is positively
related to time. (See Alchian and Allen (1977, p.62).) The permanent effect suggested by
the concept of a downward sloping demand curve for securities implies a relatively
inelastic reaction in securities markets even in the long-run. For further discussion of
temporary and permanent price effects in securities markets, see Lamoureux and Poon’s
(1987) analysis of stock splits and Madhavan’s (2001) recent analysis of stock index
reconstitution.12
Using this terminology, the order flow imbalance story predicts that the ex-date
return is only a temporary price pressure. By contrast, the investor clientele and
convenience stories offered by Vijh (1994) predict a permanent ex-date return.
C.3.Liquidity
A final possible explanation for the when-issued premium is a liquidity differential
between when-issued shares and regular-way trading. This argument relies on Amihud
and Mendelson’s (1986) research that market liquidity is priced in traded securities.
The liquidity explanation has not been emphasized in the when-issued literature.
This is due in part to the fact that all of the prior research finds that when-issued shares
trade at a premium but also have lower average trading volume. For such reasons, recent
work such as Nayar and Rozeff (2001) does not attempt to test a liquidity hypothesis and
instead considers a convenience explanation.
 Conceptually, however, liquidity may be relevant to the pricing of when-issued
and regular-way shares, even if liquidity is neither the sole nor dominant factor. For one,
many of the measurement issues discussed in Section II.C.1 above are related to liquidity
differences. The effect of the timing of trades and bid-ask bounce, for example, are more
likely to be important if when-issued and regular-way trades occur at different rates and
magnitudes. Similarly, a more heavily traded security may also be more likely to have
volume on regional exchanges and thereby be more likely to trade under worse execution.
The concept of liquidity also offers further clarification of the microstructure
explanations discussed in Section II.C.2 above. For example, liquidity is distinct from
order flow imbalances. Liquidity is tied to high volume that is balanced between buys13
and sells. By contrast, order flow imbalances stem from trades that cluster at either buys
or sells, possibly under conditions of heavy volume. (See, Chordia, Roll and
Subrahmanyam (2002) for a discussion of the contrast between liquidity and order
imbalances at the market level.)
Liquidity can also be distinguished from the convenience explanation offered by
Vijh (1994) and examined by Nayar and Rozeff (2001). Convenience refers to non-
volume characteristics such as due bills that may induce a preference for when-issued
shares vis-à-vis regular-way shares. Of course, one puzzle with the convenience
explanation from the extant empirical results is why the more convenient security, the
when-issued shares, would trade at noticeably lower levels of volume.
III. The Sample and Proposed Analysis
A.  The Sample
Our sample comprises a set of NYSE-listed, publicly-traded subsidiaries and their
parent firms around the time the subsidiaries are fully spun off to the public. For a week
or more prior to the spin off, a when-issued market arises in shares of the subsidiary. For
most of the firms in the sample, there is also when-issued trading in the shares of the
parent firm.
To construct our sample, we use Standard and Poor’s quarterly volumes of the
NYSE Daily Stock Price Record, the same source used in prior studies such as Choi and
Strong (1983), Vijh (1994) and Nayar and Rozeff (2001). We manually search the NYSE
Daily Stock Price Record for all incidences of when-issued trading during the period
from 1980 to 2
nd quarter 1999, the most recent volume available when the project was14
initiated. We discern roughly 3,000 cases of firms with when-issued trading over this
time period. We then use information in the Daily Stock Price Record, the Wall Street
Journal Index, Lexis-Nexis, and other financial media to determine the event associated
with each case of when-issued trading. By far, most of the cases of when-issued trading
(80 percent) are associated with stock splits. Other events making up more than five
percent of the total number of cases of when-issued trading include bidders in corporate
takeovers and parents and wholly-owned subsidiaries involved in a 100 percent spinoff.
Our data screening detects 23 cases of when-issued trading in NYSE-listed,
publicly-traded subsidiaries around the time the firms are fully spun off to the public. The
subsidiaries and parent firms in the sample are presented in Table 1. The data are
presented by the date of the spinoff. The representative subsidiary firm in the sample
experienced a 20 percent carve-out from its parent and then, within a year, was fully spun
off to the public. For example, Lucent Technologies was carved out from AT&T in April
1996 and then was fully spun off in October of the same year. The earliest observation is
Coopervision in 1983. The most recent observation is Delphi Automotive Systems in
1999. In three cases, the divestiture was completed via an exchange offer where parent
shareholders had the choice of whether to receive shares in the subsidiary: Guidant Corp.,
Martin Marietta Materials, and Abercrombie & Fitch.
Table 2 overviews the incidence of when-issued trading for the subsidiary firms.
For the 23 subsidiary firms, there is a total of 343 days when the Daily Stock Price
Record reports either closing prices or bid-ask spreads in the when-issued market, an
average of 15 days per firm. The number of days ranges from five days for Delphi
Automotive Systems to 28 days for Bowater Inc.15
Within the sample of 343 days from the Daily Stock Price Record, there are 298
days on which the subsidiary firms have positive when-issued volume. Table 3 compares
when-issued volume with regular-way volume for the subsidiary firms. As reported,
when-issued volume for the representative subsidiary firm is 50 percent of regular-way
volume.
B. Proposed Analysis
We use our unique sample to better understand the pricing of when-issued shares.
We begin the analysis in Section IV with a detailed treatment of the when-issued trading
in the subsidiary firms. We first use daily data to compare the when-issued and regular-
way shares of the subsidiaries. We then use intraday data to determine the extent to which
observed pricing differences stem from measurement factors.
We then consider microstructure explanations for the when-issued premium for
the subsidiary firms. Our sample allows us to contrast the investor clientele and
convenience explanations from the order-flow-imbalance explanation. The investor
clientele and convenience explanations rely on differential features between regular-way
and when-issued trading that are not present for the subsidiary firms. Hence, these two
explanations predict no difference between the regular-way and when-issued prices for
the subsidiaries. By contrast, the order-flow-imbalance explanation predicts that the price
difference between the when-issued and regular-way shares will depend on the direction
of order flow and that this direction will be reflected in an asymmetric premium when
measured at bid and ask prices.
In Section V, we provide complementary analysis of the when-issued premium
for parent-subsidiary pairs in the sample. We focus on tests that further distinguish the16
microstructure explanations by analyzing any asymmetry in the when-issued premium
when computed at bid and ask prices.
We conclude our analysis in Section VI by studying the execution date returns for
the subsidiary firms and the parent-subsidiary pairs. This analysis considers whether the
when-issued premium and the ex-date return are of the same sign in our sample. The
analysis also examines whether the factors underlying the when-issued premium and non-
zero ex-date returns reflect temporary price pressures or instead stem from a downward-
sloping demand for securities.
IV. The When-Issued Premium for Subsidiary Firms
This section begins our analysis by estimating the when-issued premium for the
subsidiary firms in the sample. After reporting our initial estimates of the premium, the
analysis follows the outline sketched in Appendix B. We consider measurement issues
that may influence the reported premium. We also perform tests that distinguish between
potential microstructure explanations of the premium.
A. Analysis Using Data from the Daily Stock Price Record
Our initial estimates of the when-issued premium employ closing prices for
regular-way and when-issued trading taken from the NYSE Daily Stock Price Record.
The analysis entails 298 days on which when-issued trading is positive. For a particular
firm on a given day, we estimate the percentage difference between the when-issued
closing price and the regular-way closing price:17
w.i. premium = (w.i. closing price – reg way closing price) / reg way closing price.
As a test of the law of one price, we test the null hypothesis that the when-issued
premium equals zero.
Table 4 presents the estimates of the when-issued premium using daily closing
prices. As reported in Panel A, the mean when-issued premium for the sample of 298
days is –0.68 percent. This value is more than 10 standard deviations from zero. The
median when-issued premium is –0.53 percent (p-level =0.0001). These results indicate
that the when-issued shares generally trade at a discount to regular-way trading. In other
words, the when-issued “premium” is actually negative for the publicly-traded
subsidiaries in our sample.
As a measure of the robustness of the estimates, Panel B of Table 4 reports the
average when-issued premium for each of the 23 subsidiary firms in the sample. On an
equally-weighted basis, the average when-issued premium across firms is –0.63 percent
(t=-5.43). For the 23 firms, 21 (or 91 percent) have an average negative premium. The
results by firm confirm the overall finding that the when-issued shares trade at a discount
to the regular-way transactions.
As a further robustness check, we also estimate the when-issued premium in event
time. In results not reported in the tables, but available upon request, we also find
evidence of a negative when-issued premium. For each of the ten days prior to the
spinoff, the when-issued premium is negative. The average when-issued premium for the
ten days is –0.61 percent (t=-6.72).18
These results of a negative when-issued premium for publicly-traded subsidiaries
are strikingly different from the prior evidence reported for stock splits (e.g., Choi and
Strong (1983)) and the spinoff of wholly-owned subsidiaries (Vijh (1994)). Note that in
some of the prior research, the estimates of the when-issued premium have accounted for
the fact that when-issued shares generally settle at a later date than regular-way trading.
Out of simplicity and because of low interest rates during our sample period, we have not
made such adjustments. But if we did, the when-issued estimates would be even more
negative. Overall, our results indicate that the previous findings of a when-issued
premium are not robust.
The literature surveyed in Appendix B, however, cautions against drawing
conclusions from analysis using closing transaction prices. One measurement issue noted
by Maloney and Mulherin (1992) for stock splits and Lease, Masulis and Page (1991) for
secondary offerings, is that observed transaction prices may be biased around large share
issuances due to clustering at either the bid or the ask. One remedy for such clustering is
to perform estimation employing quote midpoints rather than transaction prices.
The nature of the reporting procedure followed by the Daily Stock Price Record
enables an initial examination as to whether bid-ask clustering affects our estimates of the
when-issued premium. On days with zero trading volume, the Daily Stock Price Record
reports the closing bid and ask quotes for a given security. In their paper on when-issued
trading around stock splits, Choi and Strong (1983, p.1294) exclude such days “in order
to concentrate on investor behavior rather than specialist pricing.” In subsequent research
on stock splits, Lamoureux and Wansley (1989) incorporate the zero-volume when-
issued days into their analysis.19
As noted in Table 2, there are 45 days in our sample on which when-issued
trading volume is zero. On all of those days, volume for regular-way shares is positive
and the Daily Stock Price Record reports closing transaction prices. For these 45 days, we
estimate the when-issued premium as the percentage difference between the when-issued
midpoint and the regular-way transaction price:
w.i. premium = (w.i. midpoint – reg way closing price) / reg way closing price.
The results for this estimation are reported in Table 5. As reported in Panel A for
all 45 observations, the average when-issued premium using when-issued quote
midpoints is 0.009 percent and is not reliably different from zero (t=0.51). The median
value is equal to 0 (p-level=0.57). Comparable results are presented in Panel B for each
of the ten firms with at last one day of zero when-issued trading volume. The average
premium across the ten firms is –0.04 percent (t=-0.11). Half of the firms have a positive
premium, half have a negative premium.
Overall, the results using quote midpoints from the Daily Stock Price Record
evince a when-issued premium that is effectively zero. These results suggest that
measurement and microstructure factors may be at play in the finding of a negative
premium for observed closing prices. To provide a broader analysis of the measurement
and microstructure factors affecting the estimate of the when-issued premium, we next
employ intraday prices and quotes from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) Database of the New
York Stock Exchange.20
B. Analysis of Intraday Transaction Prices from TAQ
Prior research discussed in Section II and outlined in Appendix B suggests that
measurement issues may affect tests of the law of one price in financial markets. These
measurement issues include the exchange location of trades and the timing of trades.
To control for measurement issues, we employ intraday transaction prices from
the TAQ database. The data are available for the 16 subsidiary firms in the sample that
were spun off in 1993 or later. The TAQ sample entails 210 days on which the subsidiary
firms had positive when-issued trading volume.
Our initial inspection indicates that the last when-issued trade of the day occurs
predominantly on the NYSE. The last when-issued trade of the day is, on average, 53
minutes earlier than the last regular-way trade of the day.
To gauge the effect of exchange and timing differences, we estimate the when-
issued premium as the difference between the final when-issued price and four different
regular-way prices: (1) the final regular-way price (which may or may not be an NYSE
transaction), (2) the final NYSE regular-way price, (3) the adjacent NYSE trade
immediately following the final when-issued trade, and (4) the adjacent NYSE trade
immediately preceding the final when-issued trade. By design, compared to the closing
prices, the adjacent regular-way trades are much closer in time to the final when-issued
trades. The adjacent preceding trade is, on average, 6 minutes and 35 seconds before the
when-issued trade. The adjacent following trade is, on average, 4 minutes and 50 seconds
after the when-issued trade.
The results of the estimation with TAQ transaction data are reported in Table 6.
Panel A reports the results for the full sample of 210 trading days. Using the last TAQ21
price for regular-way trading, the when-issued premium equals –0.59 percent (t=-8.99).
By comparison, the premium using the last NYSE price is –0.55 percent (t=-9.51). This
narrowing of the differential between the when-issued and regular-way prices is
consistent with evidence such as Lee (1993) that prices on the NYSE reflect better
execution than that of the regionals.
The estimates of the when-issued premium using adjacent regular-way NYSE
prices indicate a further reduction in the magnitude of the when-issued premium for the
full sample. The average premium is –0.52 percent using the regular-way trade that
immediately follows the final when-issued trade; the average premium is –0.53 percent
using the immediately preceding NYSE regular-way trade. The results by firm in Panel B
of Table 6 confirm a reduction in the magnitude of the when-issued premium by
accounting for exchange location and the timing of trades within the day.
As a robustness check, we perform similar estimation for the when-issued trade
closest to 12 noon to ensure that the results are not driven by day-end pricing patterns.
(See, for example, Harris (1989) and Cushing and Madhavan (1999).) In results not
reported in the tables, we find that for both the adjacent preceding and following regular-
way trades, the when-issued premium equals –0.53 percent (t=-11.0). Hence, the finding
of a negative when-issued premium is not isolated to closing transactions on the NYSE.
These results suggest a reinterpretation of prior intraday analysis of when-issued
trading. In their study of stock splits, Brooks and Chiou (1995) provide similar evidence
that the non-synchronous matching of trades was one component of the differential
between regular-way and when-issued prices. Because they were trying to explain the
positive premium observed in prior research, Brooks and Chiou (1995) argued that the22
time-inconsistent matching induced an upward bias in the estimated premium. Our
results, however, indicate that the bias is not positive but instead is away from zero.
C. Analysis of Bid and Ask Quotes from TAQ
While the magnitude of the when-issued premium is reduced by matching the
exchange location and the timing of when-issued and regular-way trades, the when-issued
prices still reflect a discount to regular-way transactions. Following guidance from the
literature reviewed in Appendix B, we use bid and ask data from TAQ to further dissect
the sources of the observed pricing differences.
The TAQ data are summarized in Table 7. Estimates are taken at the time of the
last when-issued trade of the day. In Panel A, the average bid-ask spread for when-issued
trading is twice the magnitude of that for regular-way trading. The median spread for the
when-issued shares is ¼ while the median for regular-way shares is 1/8.
As reported in Panel B of Table 7, there is variation in the bid-ask spreads across
the 16 subsidiary firms in the sample. Prior research such as Maloney and Mulherin
(1992) and Lin and Rozeff (1995) find that the cross-section of pricing can be affected by
the variation in bid-ask spreads. As an initial examination of the importance of bid-ask
spreads for the when-issued premium, we regress the estimated percentage when-issued
premium on the percentage when-issued bid-ask spread. We obtain the following results
for a specification using the when-issued premium by firm from the last NYSE prices in
Panel B of Table 6 and the relative when-issued bid-ask spread in Panel B of Table 7:
w.i. premium =  -0.002 -  0.35 * bid-ask spread.
(t=-1.05) (t=-2.91)
N=16 Adjusted R-square = 0.3323
The regression results indicate that the when-issued premium is more negative
when the bid-ask spread is wider. In results available upon request, we obtain similar
results using specifications employing other estimates of the when-issued premium, such
as those in Table 4. The results are consistent with the view that the observed when-
issued premium is related to bid-ask spreads.
The literature in Appendix B distinguishes two different effects of bid-ask
spreads. The first is simple bid-ask clustering and the second stems from broader
microstructure factors such as order flow imbalances. We consider these two factors in
turn.
D. Analysis of Bid-Ask Clustering
One potential explanation for the observed when-issued premium is that regular-
way and when-issued trades exhibit differential clustering at bids and asks. As a
diagnostic of such tendencies, we compute the order-flow ratio, defined as:
Ratio = (Ask Price – Transaction Price) / (Ask Price – Bid Price).
This ratio ranges from 0, if the transaction occurs at the ask, to 1, if the transaction occurs
at the bid.
Table 8 reports the order flow ratio for the final when-issued transaction price as
well as for the four sets of regular-way closing prices. As reported in the final column of
Panel A, the when-issued trades have an average order-flow ratio equal to 0.52,
indicating a tendency to trade on the bid side of quote midpoints. By contrast, the four
different regular-way prices have order flow ratios ranging form 0.38 to 0.40, indicating a24
relative tendency for regular-way shares to trade near ask prices. Tests of the null
hypothesis that the order-flow ratio for regular-way trading equals that for when-issued
trading reject the null for each of the four sets of regular-way trades (t-statistics range
from 3.37 to 3.75). Similar results are provided in Panel B for the average across the 16
firms available on TAQ: the order-flow ratio indicates that the when-issued trades are
relatively more likely to be at bid prices.
The result in Table 8 naturally raises the question: why would the when-issued
shares of the subsidiary be more likely to trade at bid prices? An answer from the prior
literature (e.g., Maloney and Mulherin (1992)) is that the when-issued pricing anticipates
trading around the execution date. In our case of publicly-traded subsidiaries, there is
likely to be selling pressure on the execution date. This is because, on the margin, those
investors wishing to hold the subsidiary would have obtained shares at or soon after the
initial carve-out. By contrast, some investors in the parent are relatively less likely to
retain the subsidiary’s shares after the spin off. This net selling pressure leads to the
greater tendency for the when-issued shares to trade at bid prices. For a related story, see
the Lease, Masulis, and Page (1991) discussion of the tendency for trades to occur at bid
prices around a secondary equity offering.
The standard remedy for clustering at bid or ask prices suggested by Lease,
Masulis and Page (1991) is to re-estimate with quote midpoints rather than transaction
prices. Table 9 reports such estimates by basing the when-issued premium on when-
issued and regular-way quotes at the time of the final when-issued trade of the day. For
the full sample of 210 observations in Panel A, the mean is –0.47 percent (t=-8.60). The
results are similar in Panel B when averaged by firm. Consistent with a bias due to25
differential clustering at bids and asks in when-issued and regular-way trades, the
premium estimated using midpoints is less than that for transaction prices in Table 6.
E. Additional Microstructure Effects
The literature surveyed in Appendix B points to additional factors that can
influence when-issued pricing beyond movements within the bid-ask spread. These
include order flow imbalance, investor clienteles, and convenience. The parallel when-
issued and regular-way trading of our sample of publicly-traded subsidiaries enables us to
distinguish between these three potential explanations.
The investor clientele story relies on trading constraints prior to the execution date
that are not present for our sample. Similarly, the convenience explanation relies on
hindrances such as due bills that are not pertinent to the publicly-traded subsidiaries.
Hence, these two explanations would predict that the when-issued premium is zero for
the publicly-traded subsidiaries. The results for publicly-traded subsidiaries do not
support this prediction.
By contrast, the order-flow-imbalance explanation predicts that the sign of the
when-issued premium is a function of the direction of order flow at the execution date.
(Compare, for example, Maloney and Mulherin’s (1992) discussion of stock splits and
Hwang’s (1995) discussion of reverse splits.) As discussed above in Section D., for
publicly-traded subsidiaries, this direction is expected to be toward bid prices, resulting in
a negative premium.
The order-flow-imbalance explanation further predicts an asymmetric effect on
the when-issued premium between estimates computed at bid and ask prices. We report26
evidence on this test in Table 10. Panel A indicates that the when-issued premium
employing bid quotes is –0.65 percent, which is more than double the magnitude of the
when-issued premium of –0.28 percent estimated with ask quotes. Indeed, the median
when-issued premium using ask quotes is equal to zero. In results not reported in the
tables, analysis of quotes at 12 noon indicates a similar asymmetry: the when-issued
premium using bid quotes is –0.66 percent (t=-11.5) while the premium using ask quotes
is –0.39 percent (t=-7.04).
The analysis by firm in Panel B of Table 10 also indicates asymmetric results for
bid prices versus ask prices. The when-issued premium estimated at bid prices is –0.70%
(t=-6.18). The when-issued premium estimated at ask prices is much smaller in
magnitude, -0.14 percent, and is statistically not reliably different from zero, having a t-
statistic of –0.84.
The evidence in Table 10 indicates that in providing a market in the when-issued
shares of publicly-traded subsidiaries, the specialists on the NYSE asymmetrically alter
the bid and ask quotes in that market vis-à-vis regular-way trading. Such quote-setting
anticipates the net order flow at the execution date. These findings and interpretation are
consistent with related findings for stock splits (Maloney and Mulherin (1992), Conrad
and Conroy (1994)), reverse splits (Hwang (1995)), and seasoned equity offerings (Lease,
Masulis, and Page (1991), Barclay and Litzenberger (1988)).
A natural question is whether there are any expected arbitrage profits from the
differences in quotes between the when-issued and regular-way shares. Could an investor
expect to profit from instantaneously buying low and selling high in the when-issued nad
regular-way markets?27
Table 11 speaks to these queries. The table reports the average asks, midpoints,
and bids for when-issued and regular-way trades as well as the difference (in levels)
between the quotes in the two markets. The first observation is that the differences
between the markets are small: for example, the difference between the quote midpoints
is less than the tick size of 1/8
th that prevailed for the better part of our sample. (The
NYSE switched to trading in sixteenths on June 24, 1997.) The second observation is that
the when-issued ask quote exceeds the regular-way bid quote. Hence, an investor cannot
expect to arbitrage any pricing differences between when-issued and regular-way prices.
Even accounting for differences in settlement practices between when-issued and
regular-way trading does not allow arbitrage. As first noted in Choi and Strong (1983),
when-issued settlement is based on the ex-date, while regular-way settlement is based on
the trade date. Hence, the time value of money implies that the actual price paid for
when-issued shares is marginally less than for regular-way shares. In the TAQ sample,
the average number of days for when-issued trading is 13. For such a difference in
settlement and an interest rate of 5 percent (the average t-bill rate for the time period of
the TAQ sample), the time value savings for the $32 share reported in Table 11 is 6 cents.
This is less than the difference of 10 cents between the regular-way bid and the when-
issued ask.
F. Summary of the Analysis of the Subsidiary Firms
The analysis of the when-issued premium for the 23 subsidiary firms in our
sample has produced several new findings. First, the premium in this sample is actually
negative. Second, the analysis of bias brought by timing, exchange location, and bid-ask28
clustering indicates that the nature of the bias is away from zero, rather than being a
positive bias. Finally, we find that the magnitude of the when-issued premium differs
when estimated at bid and ask prices. This suggests that the direction and magnitude of
the when-issued premium are affected by order flow. We build on these findings by next
analyzing data for the parent firms in our sample.
V. The When-Issued Premium for Parent Subsidiary Pairs
To further understand when-issued pricing, we next analyze parent and subsidiary
pairs. We are interested in the sign and significance of the when-issued premium for the
parent-subsidiary pairs. We are also interested in whether there are any asymmetries in
the premium when estimated at bid and ask quotes.
Like the analysis in Vijh (1994), we compare the when-issued prices for the
subsidiary and new parent with the regular-way price of the old parent. The estimate is:
[(w.i. parent + (factor*w.i. subsidiary)) – regular-way parent] / regular-way parent,
where factor is the shares of stock in the subsidiary to be received per share of stock in
the parent at the execution of the spinoff.
The initial estimates come from data in the Daily Stock Price Record. Of the 23
cases in the full sample, 18 have data available to estimate the when-issued premium for
parent-subsidiary pairs, although there are slightly fewer observations for some of these
cases due to missing data. Three subsidiaries previously analyzed (Bowater, First Colony,
and Abercrombie & Fitch) are excluded because their parent firms do not have when-29
issued trading around the time of the spinoff. Two other subsidiary firms previously
analyzed (Guidant and Martin Marietta Materials) are excluded because the method of
divestiture is an exchange offer. Note, also, that at the time of the spinoff of Sante Fe
Energy Resources in 1990, the parent, Sante Fe Pacific Corp, also spun off a wholly-
owned subsidiary, Catellus Development.
The parent-subsidiary pairs with available data are described in Table 12. The
table reports a total of 226 days with available data. The table also reports the factor at
which the parent shareholders received an interest in the subsidiary firm at the execution
of the spinoff, which averages 0.82 across the sample firms.
Table 13 compares when-issued volume for the parent with regular-way volume
for the parent. Similar to the estimates for the subsidiary firms, the parents, on average,
have less volume in the when-issued market vis-à-vis regular-way volume.
Table 14 reports the when-issued premium for the parent-subsidiary pairs using
information from the Daily Stock Price Record. As reported in Panel A, the estimated
premium averages 0.53 percent (t=9.52). Similarly, the average across firms in Panel B is
0.58 percent (t=4.20). Consistent with Vijh (1994), we find a positive and significant
when-issued premium for parent-subsidiary pairs.
In his analysis, Vijh (1994) argued that the when-issued premium reflected
behavior on the date of spinoff execution. Since he was studying wholly-owned
subsidiaries, investors could not obtain shares in the subsidiary or the new, separate
parent until the spinoff occurred. Vijh (1994) argued that these constraints created
clientele effects that were reflected in when-issued pricing.30
The clientele story of Vijh (1994) does not explain our finding above of a
negative premium for the subsidiary firms. An alternative argument that can explain both
the negative premium for the subsidiary and the positive premium for the parent-
subsidiary pairs is order-flow imbalances. A key distinction of the order-flow-imbalance
explanation is that there will be an asymmetry in the premium when estimated at bid and
ask prices.
To test for this prediction of the order-flow-imbalance explanation, we employ the
TAQ database. As reported in Table 15, data are available for 12 parent-subsidiary pairs
and 162 observations. To account for timing of trades and exchange location, the
estimates in the table are taken from TAQ at the time of the last parent when-issued trade
of the day. As reported in Panel A of Table 15, the time and exchange matched estimates
obtain an average when-issued premium of 0.37% (t=8.00). Panel B reports the same
average across the 12 firms.
To consider the bid-ask asymmetry prediction of the order-flow-imbalance
explanation of the when-issued premium, Table 16 estimates the when-issued premium
for the parent-subsidiary pairs using bid quotes and ask quotes. As reported in Panel A of
the table, the results differ when the premium is estimated at the bid and at the ask. Using
ask prices, the when-issued premium for parent subsidiary pairs is positive and
significant. The mean when-issued premium computed at the ask is 0.63% (t=11.95). By
contrast, the when-issued premium computed with bid prices is not meaningfully
different from zero. Similar results obtain for the estimates across the 12 parent-
subsidiary pairs in Panel B.31
The when-issued results for the parent-subsidiary pairs have both similarities and
differences with the results for the subsidiaries reported in Section IV. The similarity is
the asymmetry between bid and ask estimates of the premium. The difference is that the
premium for the parent-subsidiary pairs is positive and that the premium is significantly
positive when estimated at ask prices.
The results suggest that the when-issued prices reflect order flow imbalances at
the execution of the spinoff. For the subsidiaries alone, the net order flow is negative on
the execution date. For the parent-subsidiary pairs, the net order flow for the parent is
positive, possibly because the execution date is the first date on which investors can
access shares in the new, separate parent. To test these implications, we next analyze the
stock returns for the subsidiary and parent on the execution date of the spinoff.
VI. The Execution Date Return of the Subsidiary and the Parent
In this section, we report the execution date return for the subsidiaries and the
parents in the sample. These estimates enable us to shed further light on the sources of
the when-issued premium. We examine whether the sign of the ex-date return for the
subsidiaries and the parent-subsidiary pairs is the same as that for the comparable when-
issued premium. We are also interested in the permanence of the ex-date return. The
order-flow-imbalance explanation suggests that the ex-date return reflects temporary
price pressures that would be more likely to be reversed the longer the window around
the date of execution.32
A. Execution Date Return for the Subsidiary
Table 17 reports the stock return for the 23 subsidiary firms in the sample on the
execution date. Data are taken from the Daily Stock Price Record. The return for the ex-
date itself is reported in Panel A. The mean return on the ex-date is –0.87% (t=-1.28).
This estimate is both of the same sign and magnitude of the estimates of the when-issued
premium for the subsidiary firms in Section IV.
One potential explanation for the negative return for the subsidiaries is that order-
flow imbalances induce temporary price pressure at the ex-date. If the order-flow-
imbalance explanation is correct, then the stock return should be zero in wider windows
around the ex-date. Lamoureux and Poon (1987) and Maloney and Mulherin (1992) make
similar observations about the execution of stock splits.
To test for the existence of temporary price pressure around the ex-date, we re-
estimate the ex-date return for the (-1,+1) window, where Day 0 is the ex-date. The
results are reported in Panel B of Table 17. The sign of the observed return reverses from
that of the Day 0 estimate: the mean value is 0.22 percent (t=0.16). This reversal in sign
is consistent with temporary order-flow imbalances in subsidiary shares around the
execution date.
B. Execution Date Return for the Parent-Subsidiary Pairs
We next perform similar estimates of the ex-date return for the parent subsidiary
pairs. Data are available for 19 spinoffs. In addition to the 18 subsidiary-parent pairs in
Table 12, the analysis includes First Colony Corp/Ethyl Corp. For the parent-subsidiary
pairs, the ex-date return is:33
[(Parent's Ex-Date Price + (factor*Subsidiary's Ex-Date Price)) - Parent's Day Minus 1
Price] / Parent's Day Minus 1 Price,
where factor is the number of shares of the subsidiary to be received per share of stock of
the parent at the execution of the spinoff.
The estimate for the execution date return for parent-subsidiary pairs is reported
in Table 18. As shown in Panel A, the average ex-date return is 1.02 percent (t=2.31).
This estimate is of the same sign and magnitude of the when-issued premium reported in
Section V for parent-subsidiary pairs. The symmetry between the ex-date and the when-
issued premium resembles the results for the subsidiary firms.
Panel B of Table 18 reports the ex-date return for the parent-subsidiary pairs over
the longer (-1,+1) window, where Day 0 is the ex-date. The average estimate is 2.28
percent (t=2.26), which is actually twice as large as the Day 0 result. This result is unlike
the reversals found for the subsidiary firms around the ex-date.
The larger ex-date return for wider windows around the ex-date does not directly
fit any of the explanations offered in the literature. If the clientele or convenience
explanation applied, one would expect the positive return to obtain only on the ex-date
itself.
The parent-subsidiary ex-date results likely stem from price pressures due to order
flow imbalances. As shown by Lamoureux and Poon (1987) and Maloney and Mulherin
(1992) for stock splits and Barclay and Litzenberger (1988) for seasoned equity offerings,
the effect of price pressures around a share offering can persist for a sustained period. Of
course, the larger ex-date effect for the longer window may also reflect a downward34
sloping demand for parent shares. A finer dissection of the ex-date results for the parent-
subsidiary pairs is a topic for future research.
VII. Summary and Concluding Comments
In this paper, we use a unique sample of when-issued trading to provide novel
tests of the law of one price in financial markets. For the 23 subsidiary firms in the
sample, we find that when-issued shares trade at a discount to regular-way shares. This
result provides a striking contrast to the finding of a premium in all prior studies of when-
issued trading in equity markets.
Although our results for the subsidiary firms differ from prior research, we find
that the magnitude and direction for the when-issued discount can be resolved via a
synthesis of explanations previously offered in the literature. One collective source for
the observed pricing differences between when-issued and regular-way shares is
improper measurement, stemming from differential exchange location and timing of
trades and from bid-ask clustering. Our analysis further indicates that the measurement
factors bias the when-issued premium away from zero rather than in a positive direction
as argued in prior research.
The unique nature of the subsidiary firms in our sample enables us to distinguish
between microstructure explanations for the remaining differential between the when-
issued and regular-way shares. The finding of a non-zero pricing differential for the
subsidiary firms is not consistent with either the investor clientele or convenience
explanations. By contrast, the finding of an asymmetric when-issued premium for the
subsidiary firms using bid and ask prices is consistent with an order-flow-imbalance35
explanation. The order-flow-imbalance story is further supported by the results for the
when-issued premium for parent-subsidiary pairs.
Our analysis of execution date returns is also consistent with the order-flow-
imbalance explanation for the when-issued premium. For both the subsidiary firms and
the parent-subsidiary pairs, the ex-date return is of the same magnitude and direction as
the when-issued premium. For the subsidiary firms, the ex-date return is not permanent,
suggesting that the underlying factor for both the when-issued premium and the execution
date return is temporary price pressures brought about by order-flow imbalances.
One implication of the order-flow-imbalance explanation is that the evidence on
when-issued trading is consistent with the law of one price in the presence of transaction
costs. Our results, therefore, can be interpreted as consistent with stock market efficiency.
Hence, our interpretation of the evidence for when-issued trading is more optimistic
toward market efficiency than that of Thaler (1999) and Shleifer (2000) for other cases of
pairs trading.
Our results have important policy implications. Our results suggest that many
apparent violations of the law of one price in financial markets simply reflect transaction
costs. This resembles findings in the retail sector and in international trade (Engel and
Rogers (2001), Asplund and Friberg (2001)). Under this interpretation, one can rely on
innovations in market design to evolve to mitigate purported mispricing in financial
markets. (See, for example, Kadapakkam (2000).)
Regardless of one’s policy viewpoint, our results confirm that trading costs are an
important feature of financial markets. A fruitful direction for future study would be to
better understand the degree to which the trading costs in financial markets influence the36
decisions of corporate managers and the design of corporate securities. Might market
microstructure phenomena explain why corporate managers often engage in a multi-stage
divestiture process that begins with an equity carve-out and ends with a corporate
spinoff? Indeed, the corporate decisions that create the natural experiment for both our
research and that of Lamont and Thaler (2001) and Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford (2002)
likely reflect a deeper interplay between corporate finance and market microstructure.
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Appendix A. Prior Empirical Research. This table summarizes prior empirical research on the when-
issued premium and on execution date returns.
Panel A. Prior Research on the When-Issued Premium
Paper Event Time Period # Firms Premium
Choi & Strong (1983) stock splits 1977-80 128 1.17%
Lamoreux & Wansley (1989) stock splits 1962-85 140 0.70%
Brooks & Chiou (1995) stock splits 1989 71 1.24%
Nayar & Rozeff (2001) stock splits 1973-93 1,528 1.93%
Vijh (1994) spinoffs 1974-90 29 2.41%
(parent-subsidiary pairs)
Panel B. Prior Research on Ex-Date Returns
Paper Event Time Period # Firms Return
Grinblatt, et al (1984) stock splits 1967-76 1,360 1.95%
Maloney & Mulherin (1992) stock splits 1985-89 446 2.24%
Conrad & Conroy (1994) stock splits 1980-83 217 NYSE 0.48%
1983-90 1,419 NASDAQ 1.72%
Hwang (1995) reverse splits 1972-90 430 -5.09%
Copeland, et al (1987) spinoffs 1962-83 160 2.19%










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1. The Sample Firms
This table reports the 23 subsidiary firms in the sample, their former parents, and the
dates of their carve-out and subsequent spinoff. The sample was collected by first
identifying cases of when-issued trading in the NYSE Daily Stock Price Record and then
using information in the Daily Stock Price Record, the Wall Street Journal Index, Lexis-
Nexis, and other financial media to detect cases of when-issued trading of publicly-traded
subsidiaries around the time they are fully spun off to the public.
________________________________________________________________________
Subsidiary Firm Parent Carve-out Date Spinoff date
________________________________________________________________________
Coopervision Inc Cooper Labs 1/21/83 12/15/83
Trans World Airlines Transworld Corp 2/24/83 2/2/84
Bowater Inc Bowater PLC 5/18/84 9/4/84
Burlington Resources Burlington Northern 7/8/88 1/3/89
Kaufman & Broad Home Broad Inc 8/1/86 3/7/89
Santa Fe Energy Resources Santa Fe Pacific  3/9/90 12/5/90
El Paso Natural Gas Burlington Resources 3/13/92 7/1/92
First Colony Corp Ethyl Corp 12/8/92 7/1/93
Dean Witter Discover Sears 2/23/93 7/13/93
Airtouch Pacific Telesis 12/3/93 4/6/94
Santa Fe Pacific Gold Santa Fe Pacific 6/16/94 10/3/94
Capital One Financial Signet Bank 11/16/94 3/1/95
Allstate Sears 6/3/93 7/13/95
Guidant Corp Eli Lilly 12/14/94 9/29/95
Lucent Technologies AT&T 4/4/96 10/1/96
Sterling Commerce Sterling Software 3/8/96 10/8/96
Union Pacific Resources Union Pacific Corp 10/11/95 10/16/96
Martin Marietta Materials Lockheed Martin 2/17/94 11/4/96
Midway Games WMS Industries 10/30/96 4/7/98
Associates First Capital Ford 5/8/96 4/8/98
Abercrombie & Fitch Limited 9/26/96 6/2/98
Convergys Corp Cincinnati Bell 8/13/98 1/4/99
Delphi Automotive Systems General Motors 2/5/99 5/28/9943
Table 2. The Incidence of When-Issued Trading for the Subsidiary Firms
This table overviews the incidence of when-issued trading for the 23 subsidiary firms in
the sample. Information to construct the table is taken from the NYSE Daily Stock Price
Record. The 1
st w.i. date is the initial date for which either when-issued transaction prices
or bid and ask quotes are reported in the Daily Stock Price Record. The # w.i. days are
the total number of days for which either when-issued transaction prices or bid and ask
quotes are reported in the Daily Stock Price Record. Pos Vol indicates the number of
days for which there is positive volume in the when-issued market and the Daily Stock
Price Record reports closing transaction prices. Zero Vol indicates the number of days in
the when-issued market with zero volume where the Daily Stock Price Record reports
closing bid and ask quotes. The Spinoff Date is the date on which the sample firm is fully
spun off to the public and is also the day following the last day of when-issued trading.
________________________________________________________________________
# w.i. Pos Zero Spinoff
Subsidiary Firm 1
st w.i. date days Vol Vol Date
________________________________________________________________________
Coopervision Inc 12/6/83 7 4 3 12/15/83
Trans World Airlines 12/29/83 24 24 0 2/2/84
Bowater Inc 7/24/84 28 15 13 9/4/84
Burlington Resources 12/12/88 14 14 0 1/3/89
Kaufman & Broad Home 2/22/89 9 8 1 3/7/89
Santa Fe Energy Resources 11/23/90  8 8 0 12/5/90
El Paso Natural Gas 6/9/92 16 15 1 7/1/92
First Colony Corp 6/7/93 18 3 15 7/1/93
Dean Witter Discover 6/21/93 15 9 6 7/13/93
Airtouch 3/15/94 15 15 0 4/6/94
Santa Fe Pacific Gold 9/6/94 19 19 0 10/3/94
Capital One Financial 2/6/95 16 15 1 3/1/95
Allstate 6/21/95 15 15 0 7/13/95
Guidant Corp 9/19/95 8 8 0 9/29/95
Lucent Technologies 9/13/96 12 12 0 10/1/96
Sterling Commerce 9/25/96 9 9 0 10/8/96
Union Pacific Resources 9/23/96 17 15 2 10/16/96
Martin Marietta Materials 10/10/96 17 17 0 11/4/96
Midway Games 3/27/98 7 7 0 4/7/98
Associates First Capital 3/10/98 21 21 0 4/8/98
Abercrombie & Fitch 4/29/98 20 20 0 6/2/98
Convergys Corp 11/30/98 23 21 2 1/4/99
Delphi Automotive Systems 5/21/99 5 4 1 5/28/99
Total 343 298 45
________________________________________________________________________44
Table 3. Trading Volume for the Subsidiary Firms
This table reports average daily when-issued and regular-way trading volume (in
hundreds of shares) for the 23 subsidiary firms in the sample. Data come from the Daily
Stock Price Record and are for days with positive when-issued volume. Ratio is average
daily when-issued volume as a fraction of average daily regular-way volume.
________________________________________________________________________
Subsidiary Firm # days When-issued Regular-way Ratio
Coopervision Inc 4 56 143 39%
Trans World Airlines 24 1338 2208 61%
Bowater Inc 15 25 1079 2%
Burlington Resources 14 1148 3549 32%
Kaufman & Broad Home 8 228 944 24%
Santa Fe Energy Resources 8 431 346 124%
El Paso Natural Gas 15 169 216 78%
First Colony Corp 3 627 561 112%
Dean Witter Discover 9 102 8030 1%
Airtouch 15 6084 12141 50%
Santa Fe Pacific Gold 19 3029 5711 53%
Capital One Financial 15 368 2550 14%
Allstate 15 2139 8066 27%
Guidant Corp 8 10794 11867 91%
Lucent Technologies 12 8974 18014 50%
Sterling Commerce 9 2850 5464 52%
Union Pacific Resources 15 2149 5016 43%
Martin Marietta Materials 17 7502 4229 177%
Midway Games 7 280 1331 21%
Associates First Capital 21 5984 9431 63%
Abercrombie & Fitch 20 1704 7197 24%
Convergys Corp 21 401 3694 11%
Delphi Automotive Systems 4 676 40627 2%
Total 298 Average 50%
________________________________________________________________________45
Table 4. When-Issued Premium for Subsidiary Firms Using Daily Closing Prices
This table reports the when-issued premium for subsidiary firms using the closing
transaction prices reported in the NYSE Daily Stock Price Record. The when issued
premium is defined as (w.i. price - regular way price)/regular way price. Panel A reports
the data for the full sample of 298 trading days where there was positive trading volume
in the when-issued market. The p-level for the median is based on the Wilcoxon signed
rank test of the null that the median is zero. Panel B reports the data by subsidiary firm.
The t-statistic in this panel tests the null that the average premium by firm equals zero.
________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. When-Issued Premium Using Closing Prices (N=298)
Mean -0.68% Median -0.53%
(t-statistic) (-10.6) (p-level) (0.0001)
________________________________________________________________________
Panel B. When-Issued Premium by Subsidiary Firm
Subsidiary Firm # days w.i. premium
Coopervision Inc 4 0.38%
Trans World Airlines 24 -1.56%
Bowater Inc 15 -1.06%
Burlington Resources 14 -0.89%
Kaufman & Broad Home 8 -0.49%
Santa Fe Energy Resources 8 -0.62%
El Paso Natural Gas 15 -0.70%
First Colony Corp 3 -1.98%
Dean Witter Discover 9 -0.76%
Airtouch 15 -0.74%
Santa Fe Pacific Gold 19 -0.93%
Capital One Financial 15 -1.03%
Allstate 15 -0.13%
Guidant Corp 8 -0.30%
Lucent Technologies 12 -0.12%
Sterling Commerce 9 -0.38%
Union Pacific Resources 15 -0.24%
Martin Marietta Materials 17 -0.70%
Midway Games 7 -1.26%
Associates First Capital 21 -0.14%
Abercrombie & Fitch 20 -0.26%
Convergys Corp 21 -0.97%
Delphi Automotive Systems 4 0.31%
Total 298 Mean -0.63%
(t-statistic) (-5.43)46
Table 5. When-Issued Premium for Subsidiary Firms on Days when When-Issued
Volume Equals Zero
This table reports the when-issued premium for subsidiary firms using information taken
from the NYSE Daily Stock Price Record for the 45 days when when-issued trading
volume equals zero. On those days, the Daily Stock Price Record reports bid and ask
quotes for the when-issued market. The when-issued premium is defined as (w.i.
midpoint - regular way price)/regular way price. Panel A reports the data for the full
sample of 45 days where there was zero trading volume in the when-issued market. The
p-level for the median uses the Wilcoxon signed rank test to test the null that the median
value is zero. Panel B reports the data for the 10 sample firms with at least one day on
which when-issued trading volume equals zero. The t-statistic in this panel tests the null
that the average premium by firm equals zero.
________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. When-Issued Premium on Days with Zero When-Issued Volume (N=45)
Mean 0.09% Median 0
(t-statistic) (0.51) (p-level) (0.57)
________________________________________________________________________
Panel B. When-Issued Premium by Subsidiary Firm
Subsidiary Firm # days w.i. premium
Coopervision Inc 3 1.40%
Bowater Inc 13 0.04%
Kaufman & Broad Home 1 -1.56%
El Paso Natural Gas 1 -0.53%
First Colony Corp 15 0.36%
Dean Witter Discover 6 -0.85%
Capital One Financial 1 -1.47%
Union Pacific Resources 2 -0.11%
Convergys Corp 2 0.51%
Delphi Automotive Systems 1 1.82%
Total 45 Mean -0.04%
(t-statistic) (-0.11)
________________________________________________________________________47
Table 6. When-Issued Premium for Subsidiary Firms Using TAQ Transaction Data
This table reports the when-issued premium for subsidiary firms using information taken
from TAQ for the 16 firms with spinoffs in 1993 or later. For the final when-issued trade
of the day, we compute premiums using 4 different regular-way prices: the last regular-
way price reported on TAQ (Last Price), the last reported NYSE regular-way trade (last
NYSE), the adjacent NYSE regular-way trade immediately following the last when-
issued trade (Adjacent After), and the adjacent NYSE regular-way trade immediately
preceding the last when-issued trade (Adjacent Before). Panel A reports the data for the
full sample of 210 trading days. Panel B reports the data by firm.
________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. When-Issued Premium Using TAQ Data (N=210)
Adjacent Adjacent
Last Price Last NYSE After Before
Mean -0.59% -0.55% -0.52% -0.53%
(t-statistic) (-8.99) (-9.51) (-10.45) (-10.45)
Median -0.45% -0.42% -0.40% -0.41%
(p-level) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
________________________________________________________________________
Panel B. When-Issued Premium by Firm
Last Last Adjacent Adjac
Sample Firm # days Price NYSE After Before
First Colony Corp 3 -2.11% -2.12% -2.12% -1.83%
Dean Witter Discover 9 -0.60% -0.64% -0.49% -0.50%
Airtouch 15 -0.98% -0.55% -0.48% -0.40%
Santa Fe Pacific Gold 19 -0.89% -0.97% -0.97% -0.97%
Capital One Financial 15 -1.08% -0.98% -0.98% -0.98%
Allstate 15 -0.13% -0.11% -0.19% -0.17%
Guidant Corp 8 -0.30% -0.36% -0.41% -0.35%
Lucent Technologies 12 -0.10% 0.05% 0.03% 0.00%
Sterling Commerce 9 -0.38% -0.47% -0.47% -0.56%
Union Pacific Resources 15 -0.30% -0.27% -0.18% -0.21%
Martin Marietta Materials 17 -0.67% -0.64% -0.64% -0.67%
Midway Games 7 -1.26% -1.22% -1.30% -1.46%
Associates First Capital 21 -0.03% -0.01% -0.02% -0.03%
Abercrombie & Fitch 20 -0.49% -0.54% -0.58% -0.59%
Convergys Corp 21 -0.98% -1.02% -0.59% -0.68%
Delphi Automotive Systems 4 0.31% 0.46% -0.23% -0.08%
Mean -0.62% -0.59% -0.60% -0.59%
(t-stat) (-4.25) (-3.88) (-4.46) (-4.62)48
Table 7. When-Issued and Regular-Way Bid-Ask Spreads Using TAQ Data
This table reports when-issued and regular-way bid-ask spreads for the subsidiary firms
using information from TAQ. Estimates are taken at the time of the last when-issued
trade of the day. Data are available for the 16 firms with spinoffs in 1993 or later. Panel
A reports the data for the full sample of 210 trading days. Panel B reports the data by
firm. Absolute Spread is the Ask Price minus the Bid Price. Relative spread is the
Absolute Spread divided by the average of the Bid Price and the Ask Price.
________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. Bid-Ask Spreads for Subsidiary Firms Using TAQ Data (N=210)
When-Issued Regular-Way
Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
Mean 0.2571 0.97% 0.1577 0.60%
Median 0.2500 0.78% 0.1250 0.55%
________________________________________________________________________
Panel B. Bid-Ask Spreads by Subsidiary Firm
When-Issued Regular-Way
Subsidiary Firm days Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
First Colony Corp 3 1.2500 4.35% 0.2917 1.01%
Dean Witter Discover 9 0.5000 1.35% 0.2222 0.60%
Airtouch 15 0.2167 0.98% 0.1750 0.79%
Santa Fe Pacific Gold 19 0.1908 1.13% 0.1447 0.85%
Capital One Financial 15 0.2750 1.64% 0.1750 1.03%
Allstate 15 0.2333 0.76% 0.2000 0.64%
Guidant Corp 8 0.1719 0.64% 0.1719 0.64%
Lucent Technologies 12 0.3021 0.73% 0.1771 0.43%
Sterling Commerce 9 0.1667 0.56% 0.2083 0.70%
Union Pacific Res 15 0.2000 0.71% 0.1500 0.53%
Martin Marietta Mat 17 0.1912 0.84% 0.1691 0.73%
Midway Games 7 0.1339 0.58% 0.0893 0.39%
Associates First Cap 21 0.2619 0.33% 0.1280 0.16%
Abercrombie & Fitch 20 0.1750 0.41% 0.1156 0.27%
Convergys Corp 21 0.3274 1.67% 0.1339 0.67%
Delphi Automotive 4 0.4219 2.05% 0.0781 0.38%
Total 210
________________________________________________________________________49
Table 8. Order Flow Ratio for Subsidiary Firms Using TAQ Data
This table reports information on the location of the trades for regular-way and when-
issued trading for the 16 subsidiary firms with data available from TAQ. The statistic
reported is the order flow ratio, defined as (Closing Ask Quote - Closing Transaction
Price) / (Closing Ask Quote - Closing Bid Quote). The ratio is bounded by 0, if the trade
occurs at an ask price, and 1, if the trade occurs at a bid price. The ratio is reported for the
final when-issued trade and 4 different regular-way prices: the last regular-way price
reported on TAQ (Last Price), the last reported NYSE regular-way trade (last NYSE), the
adjacent NYSE regular-way trade immediately following the last when-issued trade
(Adjacent After), and the adjacent NYSE regular-way trade immediately preceding the
last when-issued trade (Adjacent Before). Panel A reports the data for the full sample of
210 trading days. Panel B reports the data by firm. For each of the 4 regular-way
variables, the t-statistics in both panels test the null that the difference between the
regular-way ratio and the when-issued ratio equals zero.
________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. Order Flow Ratio Using TAQ Data (N=210)
Adjacent Adjacent When
Last Price Last NYSE After Before Issued
Mean 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.52
 (t-statistic) (3.59) (3.51) (3.75) (3.37)
________________________________________________________________________
Panel B. Order Flow Ratio by Firm
Last Last Adjacent When
Sample Firm # days Price NYSE After Before Issued
First Colony Corp 3 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.83
Dean Witter Discover 9 0.33 0.28 0.61 0.72 0.66
Airtouch 15 0.40 0.60 0.53 0.53 0.72
Santa Fe Pacific Gold 19 0.32 0.26 0.32 0.29 0.48
Capital One Financial 15 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.29 0.36
Allstate 15 0.46 0.42 0.34 0.37 0.56
Guidant Corp 8 0.44 0.44 0.31 0.38 0.63
Lucent Technologies 12 0.29 0.46 0.50 0.58 0.51
Sterling Commerce 9 0.65 0.54 0.26 0.26 0.22
Union Pacific Resources 15 0.10 0.10 0.33 0.37 0.60
Martin Marietta Materials 17 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.47 0.70
Midway Games 7 0.50 0.50 0.29 0.21 0.64
Associates First Capital 21 0.47 0.42 0.34 0.37 0.56
Abercrombie & Fitch 20 0.39 0.34 0.27 0.39 0.41
Convergys Corp 21 0.38 0.42 0.52 0.39 0.43
Delphi Automotive Systems 4 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.54 0.58
Mean 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.42 0.54
(t-stat) (2.95) (3.27) (4.05) (3.59)50
Table 9. When-Issued Premium for Subsidiary Firms Using TAQ Midpoints
This table reports the when-issued premium using bid and ask quotes reported on TAQ
for the 16 firms with spinoffs in 1993 or later. For the final when-issued transaction for
each day, the bid and ask quotes  at that time for when-issued and regular-way trading are
used to estimate the when-issued premium using quote midpoints (Midpoint). Panel A
reports the data for the full sample of 210 trading days. Panel B reports the data by firm.
________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. When-Issued Premium Using TAQ Midpoints (N=210)
Midpoint
Mean -0.47%
 (t-statistic)  (-8.60)
Median -0.35%
 (p-level)  (0.0001)
________________________________________________________________________
Panel B. When-Issued Premium by Firm
Sample Firm # days Midpoint
First Colony Corp 3 -0.10%
Dean Witter Discover 9 -0.30%
Airtouch 15 -0.27%
Santa Fe Pacific Gold 19 -0.84%
Capital One Financial 15 -1.02%
Allstate 15 -0.22%
Guidant Corp 8 -0.47%
Lucent Technologies 12 -0.16%
Sterling Commerce 9 -0.49%
Union Pacific Resources 15 -0.18%
Martin Marietta Materials 17 -0.52%
Midway Games 7 -1.17%
Associates First Capital 21 0.00%
Abercrombie & Fitch 20 -0.53%
Convergys Corp 21 -0.80%




Table 10. When-Issued Premium for Subsidiary Firms Using TAQ Bids and Asks
This table reports the when-issued premium for subsidiary firms using bid and ask quotes
reported on TAQ for the 16 firms with spinoffs in 1993 or later. For the final when-issued
transaction for each day, the bid and ask quotes at that time for when-issued and regular-
way trading are used to estimate the when-issued premium using bid prices (Bid), and ask
prices (Ask). Panel A reports the data for the full sample of 210 trading days. Panel B
reports the data by firm.
________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. When-Issued Premium Using TAQ Bids and Asks (N=210)
Bid Ask
Mean -0.65% -0.28%
(t-statistic) (-10.6)  (-4.94)
Median -0.44% 0
(p-level) (0.0001)  (0.0001)
________________________________________________________________________
Panel B. When-Issued Premium by Firm
Sample Firm # days Bid Ask
First Colony Corp 3 -1.58% 1.76%
Dean Witter Discover 9 -0.68% 0.07%
Airtouch 15 -0.36% -0.17%
Santa Fe Pacific Gold 19 -0.98% -0.70%
Capital One Financial 15 -1.33% -0.72%
Allstate 15 -0.28% -0.16%
Guidant Corp 8 -0.47% -0.47%
Lucent Technologies 12 -0.31% -0.01%
Sterling Commerce 9 -0.43% -0.56%
Union Pacific Resources 15 -0.27% -0.09%
Martin Marietta Materials 17 -0.57% -0.47%
Midway Games 7 -1.27% -1.07%
Associates First Capital 21 -0.08% 0.09%
Abercrombie & Fitch 20 -0.60% -0.46%
Convergys Corp 21 -1.29% -0.31%
Delphi Automotive Systems 4 -0.70% 0.97%
Mean -0.70% -0.14%
(t-stat) (-6.18)  (-0.84)
________________________________________________________________________52
Table 11. Average Bid & Ask Quotes of Subsidiary Firms and the Absolute W.I
Premium
This table reports the average values of when-issued and regular-way quotes and the
absolute level of the w.i. premium for the 16 subsidiary firms from TAQ. Quotes for both
when-issued and regular-way trading are those reported at the time of the final when-
issued trade of the day. The Absolute Premium is the difference between the when-issued
quote and the regular-way quote.
________________________________________________________________________
Mean Values of Bid & Ask Quotes and Absolute W.I. Premium (N=210)
When-Issued Regular Way Absolute Premium
Ask Quote $32.30 $32.36 -$0.06
Midpoint $32.17 $32.28 -$0.11
Bid Quote $32.04 $32.20 -$0.16
________________________________________________________________________53
Table 12. Parent and Subsidiary Pairs
This table reports data availability and characteristics of parent-subsidiary pairs. The
sample entails 226 observations across 18 firms having positive when-issued volume for
both the parent and the subsidiary. Data are from the Daily Stock Price Record and from
financial media. Factor is the number of shares of the subsidiary to be received per share
of stock in the parent at the execution of the spinoff.
________________________________________________________________________
Data Availability and Characteristics of Parent-Subsidiary Pairs
Subsidiary Parent # days factor
Coopervision Inc Cooper Labs 4 1
Trans World Airlines Transworld Corp 17 0.93
Burlington Resources Burlington Northern 14 1.74
Kaufman & Broad Home Broad Inc 8 0.75
Santa Fe Energy Resources Santa Fe Pacific  8 0.30303
a
El Paso Natural Gas Burlington Resources 13 0.2381
Dean Witter Discover Sears 9 0.4
Airtouch Pacific Telesis 15 1
Santa Fe Pacific Gold Santa Fe Pacific 19 0.5882
Capital One Financial Signet Bank 15 1
Allstate Sears 15 0.927035
Lucent Technologies AT&T 12 0.3241
Sterling Commerce Sterling Software 9 1.5926
Union Pacific Resources Union Pacific Corp 15 0.8469
Associates First Capital Ford 21 0.2625
Midway Games WMS Industries 7 1.1977
Convergys Corp Cincinnati Bell 21 1
Delphi Automotive Systems General Motors 4 0.7
Total 226 Avg 0.82
________________________________________________________________________
a  Catellus Development was also spun off by Sante Fe Pacific at the same time.54
Table 13. Trading Volume for the Parent Firms
This table reports average daily when-issued and regular-way trading volume (in
hundreds of shares) for parent firms. The sample entails 226 observations across 18 firms
having positive when-issued volume for both the parent and the subsidiary. Data are from
the Daily Stock Price Record. Ratio is average daily when-issued volume as a fraction of
average daily regular-way volume.
________________________________________________________________________
Parent Firm # days When-issued Regular-way Ratio
Cooper Labs 4 63 298 21%
Transworld Corp 17 846 2769 31%
Burlington Northern 14 2997 3441 87%
Broad Inc 8 89 1638 5%
Santa Fe Pacific  8 1310 4610 28%
Burlington Resources 13 54 2523 2%
Sears 9 3745 11269 33%
Pacific Telesis 15 4587 9724 47%
Santa Fe Pacific 19 1345 6207 22%
Signet Bank 15 1292 2658 49%
Sears 15 2187 8892 25%
AT&T 12 19500 62069 31%
Sterling Software 9 2607 3423 76%
Union Pacific Corp 15 864 5597 15%
Ford 21 11267 30000 38%
WMS Industries 7 2911 1777 164%
Cincinnati Bell 21 1375 4595 30%
General Motors 4 426 25832 2%
Total 226 Average 39%
________________________________________________________________________55
Table 14. When-Issued Premium for Parent and Subsidiary Pairs Using Daily Data
This table reports the when issued premium for parent-subsidiary pairs. The premium is
estimated as the percentage difference between the sum of the when-issued price of the
parent plus the properly adjusted when-issued price of the subsidiary and the regular way
parent price, or
 [(w.i. parent + (factor*w.i.subsidiary)) - regular way parent] / regular way parent
where factor is the number of shares of the subsidiary to be received per share of stock in
the parent at the execution of the spinoff. The sample entails 226 observations across 18
firms having positive when-issued volume for both the parent and the subsidiary. Data
are from the Daily Stock Price Record. Panel A reports the results for the full sample of
226 observations. Panel B reports the data by parent-subsidiary pair.
________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. When Issued Premium (N=226)
Mean 0.53% Median 0.41%
(t-stat) (9.52) (p-level) (0.0001)
________________________________________________________________________
Panel B. When-Issued Premium by Parent-Subsidiary Pair
w.i.
Subsidiary Parent # days factor prem
Coopervision Inc Cooper Labs 4 1 1.88%
Trans World Airlines Transworld Corp 17 0.93 1.02%
Burlington Resources Burlington Northern 14 1.74 0.89%
Kaufman & Broad Home Broad Inc 8 0.75 2.04%
Santa Fe Energy Resources Santa Fe Pacific  8 0.30303
a 0.26%
El Paso Natural Gas Burlington Resources 13 0.2381 0.50%
Dean Witter Discover Sears 9 0.4 0.64%
Airtouch Pacific Telesis 15 1 0.12%
Santa Fe Pacific Gold Santa Fe Pacific 19 0.5882 -0.11%
Capital One Financial Signet Bank 15 1 0.47%
Allstate Sears 15 0.927035 0.29%
Lucent Technologies AT&T 12 0.3241 0.39%
Sterling Commerce Sterling Software 9 1.5926 -0.01%
Union Pacific Resources Union Pacific Corp 15 0.8469 0.25%
Associates First Capital Ford 21 0.2625 0.74%
Midway Games WMS Industries 7 1.1977 0.60%
Convergys Corp Cincinnati Bell 21 1 0.59%
Delphi Automotive Systems General Motors 4 0.7 -0.04%
Total 226 Mean 0.58%
(t-stat) (4.20)
________________________________________________________________________
a  The estimates incorporate Catellus Development, also spun off by Sante Fe Pacific.56
Table 15. When-Issued Premium for Parent and Subsidiary Pairs Using TAQ LAST
NYSE Data
This table reports the when issued premium for parent-subsidiary pairs using TAQ data
for the last NYSE transaction of the day. The premium is estimated as the percentage
difference between the sum of the when-issued price of the parent plus the properly
adjusted when-issued price of the subsidiary and the regular way parent price, or
 [(w.i. parent + (factor*w.i.subsidiary)) - regular way parent] / regular way parent
where factor is the number of shares of the subsidiary to be received per share of stock in
the parent at the execution of the spinoff. Prices are taken from TAQ at the time of the
last parent NYSE when-issued trade of the day. The sample entails 162 observations
across 12 firms having positive when-issued volume for both the parent and the
subsidiary and having a spinoff date in 1993 or later. Panel A reports the results for the
full sample of 162 observations. Panel B reports the data by parent-subsidiary pair.
________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. When Issued Premium (N=162)
Mean 0.37% Median 0.33%
(t-stat) (8.00) (p-level) (0.0001)
________________________________________________________________________
Panel B. When-Issued Premium by Parent-Subsidiary Pair
w.i.
Subsidiary Parent # days factor prem
Dean Witter Discover Sears 9 0.4 0.63%
Airtouch Pacific Telesis 15 1 0.20%
Santa Fe Pacific Gold Santa Fe Pacific 19 0.5882 -0.12%
Capital One Financial Signet Bank 15 1 0.49%
Allstate Sears 15 0.927035 0.28%
Lucent Technologies AT&T 12 0.3241 0.38%
Sterling Commerce Sterling Software 9 1.5926 -0.01%
Union Pacific Resources Union Pacific Corp 15 0.8469 0.25%
Associates First Capital Ford 21 0.2625 0.74%
Midway Games WMS Industries 7 1.1977 0.59%
Convergys Corp Cincinnati Bell 21 1 0.59%
Delphi Automotive Systems General Motors 4 0.7 -0.04%
Total 162 Mean 0.37%
(t-stat) (5.37)
________________________________________________________________________57
Table 16. When-Issued Premium for Parent and Subsidiary Pairs Using TAQ Bid
and Ask NYSE Data
This table reports the when issued premium for parent-subsidiary pairs using TAQ data
for the last NYSE bid and ask quotes of the day. The premium is estimated as the
percentage difference between the sum of the when-issued price of the parent plus the
properly adjusted when-issued price of the subsidiary and the regular way parent price, or
 [(w.i. parent + (factor*w.i.subsidiary)) - regular way parent] / regular way parent
where factor is the number of shares of the subsidiary to be received per share of stock in
the parent at the execution of the spinoff. Prices are taken from TAQ at the time of the
last NYSE quotes of the day. The sample entails 162 observations across 12 firms having
positive when-issued volume for both the parent and the subsidiary and having a spinoff
date in 1993 or later. Panel A reports the results for the full sample of 162 observations.
Panel B reports the data by parent-subsidiary pair.
________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. When Issued Premium (N=162)
Bid Ask
Mean 0.02% 0.63%




Panel B. When-Issued Premium by Parent-Subsidiary Pair
Subsidiary Parent # days factor Bid Ask
Dean Witter  Sears 9 0.4 0.03% 0.64%
Airtouch Pacific Telesis 15 1 -0.03% 0.34%
Santa Fe Pac Gold Santa Fe Pacific 19 0.5882 -0.33% 0.28%
Capital One Fin Signet Bank 15 1 -0.04% 1.00%
Allstate Sears 15 0.927035 0.01% 0.46%
Lucent Technologies AT&T 12 0.3241 0.09% 0.35%
Sterling Commerce Sterling Software 9 1.5926 -0.04% 0.22%
Union Pacific Res Union Pacific Corp 15 0.8469 0.11% 0.40%
Associates First Cap Ford 21 0.2625 0.50% 0.78%
Midway Games WMS Industries 7 1.1977 0.16% 0.78%
Convergys Corp Cincinnati Bell 21 1 -0.15% 1.34%
Delphi Automotive  General Motors 4 0.7 -0.28% 0.51%
Total 162 Mean 0.003% 0.59%
(t-stat) (0.048) (6.17)58
Table 17. Execution Date Returns for the Subsidiary
This table reports the execution date returns for the subsidiary. Data are for the full
sample of 23 firms. Data are from the Daily Stock Price Record.
Panel A reports the return on Day 0, the ex-date itself, estimated as:
(Subdiary Ex-Date Price - Subsidiary Day Minus 1 Price) / (Subsidiary Day Minus 1
Price).
Panel B reports the comparable return for the (-1,+1) window, where Day 0 is the ex-
date.
________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. Execution Date Return for the Subsidiary, Day 0 (N=23)
Mean -0.87% Median -1.66%
(t-stat) (-1.28) (p-level) (0.13)
________________________________________________________________________
Panel B. Execution Date Return for the Subsidiary, (-1,+1) Window (N=23)
Mean 0.22% Median -0.86%
(t-stat) (0.16) (p-level) (0.81)
________________________________________________________________________59
Table 18. Execution Date Returns for Parent and Subsidiary Pairs
This table reports the execution date returns for parent-subsidiary pairs. Results are for
the 19 parent-subsidiary pairs with available data. In addition to the subsidiary-parent
pairs listed in Table 12, the analysis includes First Colony Corp/Ethyl Corp. Data are
from the Daily Stock Price Record.
Panel A reports the return on Day 0, the ex-date itself, estimated as:
[(Parent's Ex-Date Price + (factor*Subsidiary's Ex-Date Price)) - Parent's Day Minus 1
Price] / Parent's Day Minus 1 Price,
where factor is the number of shares of the subsidiary to be received per share of stock in
the parent at the execution of the spinoff.
 a
Panel B reports the comparable return for the (-1,+1) window, where Day 0 is the ex-
date.
________________________________________________________________________
Panel A. Execution Date Return for Parent-Subsidiary Pairs, Day 0 (N=19)
Mean 1.02% Median 0.82%
(t-stat) (2.31) (p-level) (0.04)
________________________________________________________________________
Panel B. Execution Date Return for Parent-Subsidiary Pairs, (-1,+1) Window (N=19)
Mean 2.28% Median 3.06%
(t-stat) (2.26) (p-level) (0.04)
________________________________________________________________________
a For the Sante Fe Energy Resources spinoff, the estimates include Catellus Development,
spun off by Sante Fe Pacific at the same time.